Tuesday 6 May 2014

Netease OAuth 2.0 Service Covert Redirect Web Security Bugs (Information Leakage & Open Redirect)


















Netease OAuth 2.0 Service Covert Redirect Web Security Bugs (Information Leakage & Open Redirect)



(1) Domain:
163.com


"NetEase, Inc. (simplified Chinese: 网易; traditional Chinese: 網易; pinyin: Wǎng Yì) is a Chinese Internet company that operates 163.com, a popular web portal ranked 27 by Alexa as of April 2014. 163.com is one of the largest Chinese Internet content providers, and as such frequently appears in the top 10 domains used in spam." (Wikipedia)







(2) Vulnerability Description:
Netease web application has a computer security problem. Hacker can exploit it by Covert Redirect cyber attacks. 


The vulnerabilities can be attacked without user login. Tests were performed on Microsoft IE (10.0.9200.16750) of Windows 8, Mozilla Firefox (34.0) & Google Chromium 39.0.2171.65-0 ubuntu0.14.04.1.1064 (64-bit) of Ubuntu (14.04),Apple Safari 6.1.6 of Mac OS X Lion 10.7. 






(2.1) Vulnerability Detail:
163's OAuth 2.0 system is susceptible to Attacks. More specifically, the authentication of parameter "&redirct_uri" in OAuth 2.0 system is insufficient. It can be misused to design Open Redirect Attacks to 163.



At the same time, it can be used to collect sensitive information of both third-party app and users by using the following parameters (sensitive information is contained in HTTP header.),
"&response_type"=sensitive_info,token...
"&scope"=get_user_info%2Cadd_share...




It increases the likelihood of successful Open Redirect Attacks to third-party websites, too.






The vulnerabilities occurs at page "/oauth2/authorize.do?" with parameter "&redirect_uri", e.g.







Before acceptance of third-party application:
When a logged-in 163 user clicks the URL ([1]) above, he/she will be asked for consent as in whether to allow a third-party website to receive his/her information. If the user clicks OK, he/she will be then redirected to the URL assigned to the parameter "&redirect_uri".




If a user has not logged onto 163 and clicks the URL ([1]) above, the same situation will happen upon login.





After acceptance of third-party application:
A logged-in 163 user would no longer be asked for consent and could be redirected to a webpage controlled by the attacker when he/she clicks the URL ([1]).





For a user who has not logged in, the attack could still be completed after a pop-up page that prompts him/her to log in.








(2.1.1) 163 would normally allow all the URLs that belong to the domain of an authorized third-party website. However, these URLs could be prone to manipulation. For example, the "&redirect_uri" parameter in the URLs is supposed to be set by the third-party websites, but an attacker could change its value to make Attacks. 



Hence, a user could be redirected from 163 to a vulnerable URL in that domain first and later be redirected from this vulnerable site to a malicious site unwillingly. This is as if the user is redirected from 163 directly. The number of 163's OAuth 2.0 client websites is so huge that such Attacks could be commonplace.




More seriously, some third-party websites may allow all URLs (even not belong to themselves) for "&redirect_uri" parameter.




Before acceptance of the third-party application, 163's OAuth 2.0 system makes the redirects appear more trustworthy and could potentially increase the likelihood of successful Open Redirect Attacks of third-party website.




Once the user accepts the application, the attackers could completely bypass 163's authentication system and attack more easily.







(2.2) Used one of webpages for the following tests. The webpage is "http://mathpost.tumblr.com/". We can suppose it is malicious and contains code that collect sensitive information of both third-party app and users.




Below is an example of a vulnerable third-party domain:
yhd.com




Vulnerable URL from 163 that is related to yhd.com:

POC:






POC Video:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0KF65swbl8A


Blog Detail:
http://tetraph.blogspot.com/2014/05/163s-oauth-20-covert-redirect-system.html







(3) What is Covert Redirect? 


Covert Redirect is a class of security bugs disclosed in May 2014. It is an application that takes a parameter and redirects a user to the parameter value without sufficient validation. This often makes use of Open Redirect and XSS (Cross-site Scripting) vulnerabilities in third-party applications.



Covert Redirect is also related to single sign-on, such as OAuth and OpenID. Hacker may use it to steal users' sensitive information. Almost all OAuth 2.0 and OpenID providers worldwide are affected. Covert Redirect can work together with CSRF (Cross-site Request Forgery) as well. 






Discover and Reporter:
Wang Jing, Division of Mathematical Sciences (MAS), School of Physical and Mathematical Sciences (SPMS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. (@justqdjing)









Related Articles:
http://tetraph.com/security/covert-redirect/163s-oauth-2-0-covert-redirect
https://twitter.com/buttercarrot/status/558906604641198081
https://itinfotechnology.wordpress.com/2014/06/02/netease-system-bug/

http://germancast.blogspot.com/2014/06/netease-hacking.html
http://essaybeans.lofter.com/post/1cc77d20_706b68a

http://diebiyi.com/articles/security/covert-redirect/163s-oauth-2-0-covert-redirect
http://lifegrey.tumblr.com/post/120698901934/whitehatview-internet-users-threatened
http://securityrelated.blogspot.com/2014/07/netease-web-service-bug.html

http://www.inzeed.com/kaleidoscope/covert-redirect/163s-oauth-2-0-covert-redirect
http://tetraph.blog.163.com/blog/static/23460305120144715554901/
https://inzeed.wordpress.com/2014/06/08/netease-163-bug/






=============










网易 网站 OAuth 2.0 隐蔽重定向 (Covert Redirect) 网络安全漏洞 (信息泄漏 & 公开重定向) 





(1) 域名:
163.com

"网易 (NASDAQ: NTES)是中国领先的互联网技术公司,利用最先进的互联网技术,加强人与人之间信息的交流和共享,实现“网聚人的力量”。创始人兼CEO是丁磊。 在开发互联网应用、服务及其它技术方面,网易始终保持业界的领先地位,并在中国互联网行业内率先推出了包括中文全文检索、全中文大容量免费邮件系统、无限容量免费网络相册、免费电子贺卡站、网上虚拟社区、网上拍卖平台、24小时客户服务中心在内的业内领先产品或服务,还通过自主研发推出了一款率先取得白金地位的国产网络游戏。网易公司推出了门户网站、在线游戏、电子邮箱、在线教育、电子商务、在线音乐、网易bobo等多种服务。" (百度百科)








(2) 漏洞描述:
 网站有有一个计算机安全问题,黑客可以对它进行隐蔽重定向 (Covert Redirect) 网络攻击。


这个漏洞不需要用户登录,测试是基于微软 Windows 8 的 IE (10.0.9200.16750); Ubuntu (14.04) 的 Mozilla 火狐 (Firefox 34.0) 和 谷歌 Chromium 39.0.2171.65-0; 以及苹果 OS X Lion 10.7 的 Safari 6.16。







(2.1) 漏洞细节:
163 的 OAuth 2.0 系统可能遭到攻击。更确切地说, 163 对 OAuth 2.0 系统的 parameter “&redirect_uri“ 验证不够充分。可以用来构造对 163 的 URL跳转 攻击。




与此同时,这个漏洞可以用下面的参数来收集第三方 App 和 用户 的敏感信息(敏感信息包含在 HTTP header里), 

"&response_type"=sensitive_info,token,code...
"&scope"=get_user_info,email...




它也增加了对第三方网站 URL跳转 攻击的成功率。






漏洞地点 "oauth2/authorize.do?",参数"&redirect_uri", e.g.

http://reg.163.com/open/oauth2/authorize.do?client_id=3898477018&redirect_uri=http%3A%2F%2Fweibo.yihaodian.com%2Fweibo%2FunionLoginAction.action%3Fstate%3Dtophttps%3A%2F%2Ftetraph.com&response_type=code&state=06c7f1548bedaf6a8e19cec28d9435c8 [1]






同意三方 App 前:

当一个已经登录的 163 用户点击上面的 URL ([1]), 对话框会询问他是否接受第三方 App 接收他的信息。如果同意,他会被跳转到 参数 "&redirect_uri" 的 URL。




如果没有登录的 163 用户点击 URL ([1]), 他登录后会发生同样的事情。






同意三方 App 后:

已经登录的 163 用户 不会再被询问是否接受 三方 App。当他点击 URL ([1]) 时,他会被直接跳转到攻击者控制的页面。



如果 163 用户没有登录,攻击依然可以在要求他登录的163的对话框被确认后完成(这个过程不会提示任何和三方 App 有关的内容)。








(2.1.1) 163 一般会允许属于已被验证过得三方 App domain 的所有 URLs。 然而,这些 URLs 可以被操控。比如,参数 "&redirect_uri" 是被三方 App 设置的,但攻击者可以修改此参数的值。




因此,163 用户意识不到他会被先从 163 跳转到第三方 App 的网页,然后从此网页跳转到有害的网页。这与从 163 直接跳转到有害网页是一样的。




因为 163 的 OAuth 2.0 客户很多,这样的攻击可以很常见。




更严重的是,有的 App 允许参数”&redirect_uri" 设置为任意 URL (不仅是属于这个 App domain 的 URL)。这样就可已从163 直接跳转,但是这种情况下,返回的 URL 里不包含敏感信息。




在同意三方 App 之前,163 的 OAuth 2.0 让用户更容易相信被跳转的页面是安全的。这增加了三方 App 被 URL跳转 攻击的成功率。




同意三方 App 后, 攻击者可以完全绕过 163 的 URL跳转 验证系统。








(2.2) 用了一个页面进行了测试, 页面是 "http://lifegreen.lofter.com/". 可以假定它是有害的,并且含有收集三方 App 和用户敏感信息的 code(两次跳转才有敏感信息,&redirect_uri 直接跳转没有)。




下面是一个有漏洞的三方 domain:

yhd.com




163 与 yhd.com 有关的有漏洞的 URL:

http://reg.163.com/open/oauth2/authorize.do?client_id=3898477018&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fpassport.yhd.com%2Fnetease%2Fcallback.do&response_type=code&state=1dca59aafb0ccfd17accfe22436eb813





POC:


http://reg.163.com/open/oauth2/authorize.do?client_id=3898477018&redirect_uri=http%3A%2F%2Ftetraph.com%2Fessayjeans%2Fseasons%2F%25E6%258B%25BE%25E7%25A7%258B.html 








POC 视频:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0KF65swbl8A


博客细节:

http://tetraph.blogspot.com/2014/05/163s-oauth-20-covert-redirect-system.html












(3) 什么是隐蔽重定向? 
隐蔽重定向 (Covert Redirect) 是一个计算机网络安全漏洞。这个漏洞发布于 2014年5月。漏洞成因是网络应用软件对跳转到合作者的跳转没有充分过滤。这个漏洞经常利用第三方网站 (包括合作网站) 的公开重定向 (Open Redirect) 或者 跨站脚本漏洞 (XSS - Cross-site Scripting) 问题。


隐蔽重定向也对单点登录 (single sign-on) 有影响。最初发布的是对两款常用登录软件 OAuth 2.0 和 OpenID 的影响。黑客可以利用真实的网站进行网络钓鱼,从而窃取用户敏感信息。几乎所用提供 OAuth 2.0 和 OpenID 服务的网站都被影响。隐蔽重定向还可以和 跨站请求伪造 (CSRF - Cross-site Request Forgery) 一起利用。




















1 comment:

  1. http://digi.163.com/14/0503/08/9RACJBK900162OUT.html

    据Cnet报道,新加坡南洋理工大学一位名叫Wang Jing的博士生,发现了OAuth和OpenID开源登录工具的“隐蔽重定向”漏洞(Covert Redirect)。

    这可导致攻击者创建一个使用真实站点地址的弹出式登录窗口——而不是使用一个假的域名——以引诱上网者输入他们的个人信息。

    鉴于OAuth和OpenID被广泛用于各大公司——如微软、Facebook、Google、以及LinkedIn——Wang表示他已经向这些公司已经了汇报。

    ReplyDelete