Thursday, 26 June 2014

Security Notice - SQL injection and related vulnerabilities

I checked the error log. and found the following error on the three web pages.
"SELECT   wp_posts.ID FROM wp_posts  WHERE 1=1  AND wp_posts.post_type = 'post'"
http://www.tetraph.com/kaleidoscope/
http://www.tetraph.com/forum
http://www.tetraph.com/blog




Someone is testing vulnerabilities the the website. we are very glad.
If you found vulnerabilities about "http://tetraph.com". Please tell us.
If you agree, we can have a hall of fame list. Though the website is not famous.
We still want to show respect to guys helped us.




Email:
justqdjing@gmail.com
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Friday, 20 June 2014

开心网 (kaixin001.com) 网站 OAuth 2.0 隐蔽重定向 (Covert Redirect) 网络安全漏洞 (信息泄漏 & 公开重定向)


















开心网 (kaixin001.com) 网站 OAuth 2.0 隐蔽重定向 (Covert Redirect) 网络安全漏洞 (信息泄漏 & 公开重定向) 




(1) 域名:kaixin001.com


” 开心网由北京开心人信息技术有限公司创办于2008年3月，是国内第一家以办公室白领用户群体为主的社交网站。开心网为广大用户提供包括日记、相册、动态 记录、转帖、社交游戏在内的丰富易用的社交工具，使其与家人、朋友、同学、同事在轻松互动中保持更加紧密的联系。截至2012年4月底，网站注册用户已突 破1.3亿，已发展成为中国最领先和最具影响力的实名化社交网站。” (百度百科)








(2) 漏洞描述:
开心网网站有有一个计算机安全问题，黑客可以对它进行隐蔽重定向 (Covert Redirect) 网络攻击。


这个漏洞不需要用户登录，测试是基于微软 Windows 8 的 IE (10.0.9200.16750); Ubuntu (14.04) 的 Mozilla 火狐 (Firefox 34.0) 和 谷歌 Chromium 39.0.2171.65-0; 以及苹果 OS X Lion 10.7 的 Safari 6.16。
 
 
 
 

(2.1) 漏洞细节:
Kaixin 的 OAuth 2.0 系统可能遭到攻击。更确切地说， Kaixin 对 OAuth 2.0 系统的 parameter “&redirect_uri“ 验证不够充分。可以用来构造对 Kaixin 的 URL跳转 攻击。

与此同时，这个漏洞可以用下面的参数来收集第三方 App 和 用户 的敏感信息（敏感信息包含在 HTTP header里），
“&response_type”=sensitive_info,token,code…
“&scope”=get_user_info,email…

它也增加了对第三方网站 URL跳转 攻击的成功率。




同意三方 App 前：
当一个已经登录的 Kaixin 用户点击上面的 URL ([1]), 对话框会询问他是否接受第三方 App 接收他的信息。如果同意，他会被跳转到 参数 “&redirect_uri” 的 URL。
如果没有登录的Kaixin 用户点击 URL ([1]), 他登录后会发生同样的事情。


同意三方 App 后：
已经登录的 Kaixin 用户 不会再被询问是否接受 三方 App。当他点击 URL ([1]) 时，他会被直接跳转到攻击者控制的页面。

如果 Kaixin 用户没有登录，攻击依然可以在要求他登录的Kaixin的对话框被确认后完成（这个过程不会提示任何和三方 App 有关的内容）。



(2.1.1) Kaixin 一般会允许属于已被验证过得三方 App domain 的所有 URLs。 然而，这些 URLs 可以被操控。比如，参数 “&redirect_uri” 是被三方 App 设置的，但攻击者可以修改此参数的值。

因此，Kaixin 用户意识不到他会被先从 Kaixin 跳转到第三方 App 的网页，然后从此网页跳转到有害的网页。这与从 Kaixin 直接跳转到有害网页是一样的。

因为 Kaixin 的 OAuth 2.0 客户很多，这样的攻击可以很常见。

在同意三方 App 之前，Kaixin 的 OAuth 2.0 让用户更容易相信被跳转的页面是安全的。这增加了三方 App 被 URL跳转 攻击的成功率。
同意三方 App 后， 攻击者可以完全绕过 Kaixin 的 URL跳转 验证系统。



(2.2) 用了一个页面进行了测试， 页面是 “https://redysnowfox.wordpress.com/“. 可以假定它是有害的，并且含有收集三方 App 和用户敏感信息的 code。

下面是一个有漏洞的三方 domain:
sohu.com













(3) 什么是隐蔽重定向? 
 
隐蔽重定向 (Covert Redirect) 是一个计算机网络安全漏洞。这个漏洞发布于 2014年5月。漏洞成因是网络应用软件对跳转到合作者的跳转没有充分过滤。这个漏洞经常利用第三方网站 (包括合作网站) 的公开重定向 (Open Redirect) 或者 跨站脚本漏洞 (XSS – Cross-site Scripting) 问题。
 

隐蔽重定向也对单点登录 (single sign-on) 有影响。最初发布的是对两款常用登录软件 OAuth 2.0 和 OpenID 的影响。黑客可以利用真实的网站进行网络钓鱼，从而窃取用户敏感信息。几乎所用提供 OAuth 2.0 和 OpenID 服务的网站都被影响。隐蔽重定向还可以和 跨站请求伪造 (CSRF – Cross-site Request Forgery) 一起利用。它的 scipID ID 是 13185; OSVDB ID 是 106567;  Bugtraq ID 是 67196;  X-Force ID 是 93031。
 
 
 












========




Kaixin Online Website OAuth 2.0 Covert Redirect Web Security Bugs (Information Leakage & Open Redirect)


(1) Domain:kaixin.com

“Kaixin001 (Chinese: 开心网; pinyin: Kāixīnwǎng; literally: “Happy Net”) is a leading social networking website launched in March 2008. In 2010, Kaixin001 ranks as the 13th most popular website in China and 67th overall according to Alexa Internet. On 20 May 2009, Kaixin001 formally sued Qianxiang Group for unfair competition. Qianxiang Group runs one of China’s popular social networks Renren. It purchased the kaixin.com domain and launched a Kaixin001 clone. This enables Renren to confuse users and attract some Kaixin001 potential users to the Kaixin.com clone. In October 2011, Kaixin001 won a victory. The Beijing Second Intermediate People’s Court ordered Oak Pacific to cease all use of kaixin.com and pay 400,000 renminbi ($60,000) in damages. The other main competition for Kaixin001 is Weibo.com, which is like a hybrid of Twitter and Facebook. Weibo.com has 140 million users and is owned by Sina.com.” (Wikipedia)




(2) Vulnerability Description:
Kaixin web application has a computer security problem. Hacker can exploit it by Covert Redirect cyber attacks. 


The vulnerabilities can be attacked without user login. Tests were performed on Microsoft IE (10.0.9200.16750) of Windows 8, Mozilla Firefox (34.0) & Google Chromium 39.0.2171.65-0 ubuntu0.14.04.1.1064 (64-bit) of Ubuntu (14.04)，Apple Safari 6.1.6 of Mac OS X Lion 10.7. 
 
 


(2.1) Vulnerability Detail:
Kaixin’s OAuth 2.0 system is susceptible to Attacks. More specifically, the authentication of parameter “&redirct_uri” in OAuth 2.0 system is insufficient. It can be misused to design Open Redirect Attacks to Kaixin.

At the same time, it can be used to collect sensitive information of both third-party app and users by using the following parameters (sensitive information is contained in HTTP header.),

“&response_type”=sensitive_info,token…
“&scope”=get_user_info%2Cadd_share…


It increases the likelihood of successful Open Redirect Attacks to third-party websites, too.



Before acceptance of third-party application:
When a logged-in user clicks the URL ([1]) above, he/she will be asked for consent as in whether to allow a third-party website to receive his/her information. If the user clicks OK, he/she will be then redirected to the URL assigned to the parameter “&redirect_uri”.

If a user has not logged onto Kaixin and clicks the URL ([1]) above, the same situation will happen upon login.


After acceptance of third-party application:
A logged-in user would no longer be asked for consent and could be redirected to a webpage controlled by the attacker when he/she clicks the URL ([1]).

For a user who has not logged in, the attack could still be completed after a pop-up page that prompts him/her to log in.



(2.1.1) Kaixin would normally allow all the URLs that belong to the domain of an authorized third-party website. However, these URLs could be prone to manipulation. For example, the “&redirect_uri” parameter in the URLs is supposed to be set by the third-party websites, but an attacker could change its value to make Attacks.

Hence, a user could be redirected from Kaixin to a vulnerable URL in that domain first and later be redirected from this vulnerable site to a malicious site unwillingly. This is as if the user is redirected from Kaixin directly. The number of Kaixin’s OAuth 2.0 client websites is so huge that such Attacks could be commonplace.

Before acceptance of the third-party application, Kaixin’s OAuth 2.0 system makes the redirects appear more trustworthy and could potentially increase the likelihood of successful Open Redirect Attacks of third-party website.

Once the user accepts the application, the attackers could completely bypass Kaixin’s authentication system and attack more easily.



 
(2.2) One of webpages was used for the following tests. The webpage is “http://mathpost.tumblr.com/“. We can suppose it is malicious and contains code that collect sensitive information of both third-party app and users.

Below is an example of a vulnerable third-party domain:
sohu.com














(3) What is Covert Redirect? 
Covert Redirect is a class of security bugs disclosed in May 2014. It is an application that takes a parameter and redirects a user to the parameter value without sufficient validation. This often makes use of Open Redirect and XSS (Cross-site Scripting) vulnerabilities in third-party applications.

 
Covert Redirect is also related to single sign-on. It is known by its influence on OAuth and OpenID. Hacker may use it to steal users’ sensitive information. Almost all OAuth 2.0 and OpenID providers worldwide are affected. Covert Redirect can work together with CSRF (Cross-site Request Forgery) as well. After Covert Redirect was published, it is kept in some common databases such as SCIP, OSVDB, Bugtraq, and X-Force. Its scipID is 13185, while OSVDB reference number is 106567. Bugtraq ID: 67196.  X-Force reference number is 93031.
 
 
 

Discover and Reporter:
Wang Jing, Division of Mathematical Sciences (MAS), School of Physical and Mathematical Sciences (SPMS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. (@justqdjing)
http://tetraph.com/wangjing/










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Facebook globally crashed down, What happened? DDOS? (Sorry, Something Went Wrong.)

Facebook crashed down, What happened?
Sorry, Something Went Wrong.  Server broken down
Was it suffering DDOS (Denial of Service) just now?
From China?

Screen Recorded at 8:17 am & 8:25 am GMT, 19 June, 2014









Reporter:
WANG Jing (王晶), a mathematics PhD student from Nanyang Technological University. He got his bachelar degree of Mathematics from University of Science and Technology of China.
http://www.tetraph.com/wangjing/






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Tuesday, 10 June 2014

Covert Redirect Vulnerability





Covert Redirect Vulnerability
Covert Redirect is an application that takes a parameter and redirects a user to the parameter value WITHOUT SUFFICIENT validation. This is often the of result of a website’s overconfidence in its partners. In another word, the Covert Redirect vulnerability exists because there is not sufficient validation of the redirected URLs that belong to the domain of the partners.
Two main validation methods that would lead to Covert Redirect Vulnerability:
(1) Validation using a matched domain-token pair
(2) Validation using a whitelist





Q&A


Why is it called Covert Redirect Vulnerability?

The name Covert Redirect is derived from and to contrast with the existing vulnerability Open Redirect. An Open Redirect is an application that takes a parameter and redirects a user to the parameter value WITHOUT ANY validation (OWASP). If a website is exposed to Open Redirect attack, it is often because of its own negligence.

A Covert Redirect resembles an Open Redirect however it is preceded by a normal redirect from the Website to a partner that is exposed to Open Redirect attacks. Covert Redirect vulnerability exists because of the Website’s overconfidence in its partners, consequently giving leeway to the attackers. The Website relies on its partners to provide a list of “trustworthy” domains and assumes all would be safe. However, without sufficient verification of the redirected URLs, no safety could be guaranteed.





What is Covert Redirect based on validation using a matched domain-token pair?

The Website checks the domain name against the token (assigned to the partner as a means for verification) in the redirected URL. If the pair is on the approved list in its database, the Website would allow the redirection. However, if the URL belongs to a domain that has Open Redirect vulnerability, users could be redirected from the Website to the vulnerable site and then to a malicious site.
Some Examples,
WebsiteCompanyBlog DetailPOC Video
amazon.comAmazonBlogYoutube
nytimes.com NYTimesBlogYoutube





What is Covert Redirect based on validation using a whitelist?

The Website preserves a whitelist of domains to which they allow redirection. The whitelist usually comprises of well-known web giants, e.g. Google, Facebook and LinkedIn.

Before a user is redirected out of the Website, it will check whether the redirected URL belongs to the domains on its whitelist. If it does, the Website will authorize the redirection. However, if the URL belongs to a domain that has Open Redirect vulnerability, then the user could be redirected from the Website to the vulnerable site and then to a malicious site.
Some Examples,
WebsiteCompanyBlog DetailPOC Video
ebay.comeBayBlogYoutube
wordpress.comWordPressBlogYoutube
odnoklassniki.ruOdnoklassniki.ruBlogYoutube
godaddy.comGoDaddyBlogYoutube
youku.comYoukuBlogYoutube

The validation system related to OAuth 2.0 and OpenID could be viewed as using a semi-whitelist. The list is not specified by the Website (provider) but rather by the partners (clients).
OAuth 2.0 and OpenID Covert Redirect





Who should be responsible for the vulnerability?

The vulnerability is in general due to the existing weakness in the partner websites; therefore, the Website might not feel it is responsible to patch up the vulnerability. To the partners, they may be unaware of the vulnerability or do not bother to fix it. In my view, the Website should be responsible for the vulnerability because attacks are mainly targeted at them.




How widespread is the vulnerability?

Its sphere of influence is almost as wide as that of Open Redirect vulnerability.





Why is it a serious vulnerability?

▪ Enable Open Redirect Attacks
▪ Wide coverage (It could potentially affect as many websites as Open Redirect could do)
▪ Possibility of sensitive information leakage (such as Covert Redirect vulnerability related to OAuth 2.0 and OpenID)




How to patch the vulnerability?

The Website(s) need to carry out sufficient verification of the URLs for redirection.





What is the meaning of the logo?

The logo depicts the three parties involved in the attack: the website of interest (“the Website” hereafter; top-left), the partner (bottom) and the attacker (top-right).

Due to the loophole in the partnership, the attacker is able to attack the Website through the link between them. The partner therefore acts as a bridge between the Website and the attacker, albeit unintentionally.

The entire logo is made up of two hemispheres that look like mirror images of each other, except that the colors are different. The attack could be seen as a redirect from the partner but it is preceded or masked by a redirect from the Website to the partner. The blue background of the left hemisphere signifies the purview of the Website who is only aware of the first redirect and believes it to be safe. However, there is an attendant malicious redirect from the client to the attacker, which appears “invisible” to the Website. Thus, a white background is chosen for the right hemisphere to represent the space in which the second redirect occurs. To the attacker, the second redirect may be the real attack while the first one only a camouflage.





Who found the Covert Redirect Vulnerability?

The vulnrability was found by WANG Jing, a PhD student in mathematics from Nanyang Technological University.








Reference








From:
http://tetraph.com/covert_redirect/





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